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1. A Philosophical Proof Against Common Sense
Many philosophers think that common sense knowledge survives sophisti-
cated philosophical proofs against it. It is much more certain that things
move than it is that the premises of Zeno’s counterarguments are true. What
goes for Zeno’s arguments against motion arguably goes for philosophical
arguments against causation, time, tables, human beings, knowledge, and
more.
Recently, however, Bryan Frances (forthcoming) has advanced a philo-
sophical proof that he thinks common sense can’t survive.1 His proof exploits
various philosophical paradoxes to show how common sense engenders con-
tradiction. Consider, for example, the following set of sentences:
• Anyone with less than 1¢ is not rich.
• If anyone with less than 1¢ is not rich, then anyone with less than 2¢ is
not rich.
……
• If anyone with less than (1014 – 1)¢ is not rich, then anyone with less
than 1014¢ is not rich.
• It’s not the case that anyone with less than 1014¢ is not rich.
1 See Rinard 2013, Sider 2013, and Doulas 2020 for other arguments against common
sense.
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This is the Sorites Paradox. These claims (“the Cs”) are mutually inconsistent.
The final claim contradicts the conclusion derived from the antecedent claims,
“Anyone with less than 1014¢ is not rich.” So one of the Cs must be false.
And yet, Frances argues, all of them are commonsensical. So a common sense
claim is false. So philosophy can overturn common sense and thus common
sense methodology is unstable. QED.
This is Frances’s philosophical proof against common sense, albeit in
highly schematic form. His official proof, however, is highly elaborate and
features six detailed premises. We refrain from reproducing them here. Since
our contentions are with Frances’s first premise, that’s what we will focus on:
(1) There exists an interpretation and group of familiar ele-
mentary inference rules of sentential logic such that (i) each
so-interpreted C is commonsensical, and (ii) from just the so-
interpreted Cs there is a derivation of a pair of contradictory
claims using just those rules of inference.
Frances analyzes commonsensicality in the following way: P is common-
sensical for a certain large community at a time t if and only if virtually all
members of that community at t who understand P well are strongly disposed
to give P a high credence (forthcoming: 2). For Frances’s proof, the relevant
community is the contemporary philosophical community: common sense
amongst contemporary philosophers. Moreover, one need not be a complete
specialist to “understand P well,” but neither must one be completely naive.
(This is an important point and one we will return to in §2.) For example,
Frances says that despite seeming obviously true, the proposition “There are
twice as many positive integers as there are even positive integers” does not
count as commonsensical for contemporary philosophers because enough of
us have some acquaintance with elementary number theory to reject it on
that basis (forthcoming: 2).2
As it turns out, Frances thinks that the only competent way of rejecting
2 According to Frances, better candidates for philosophical common sense might include
propositions about Liar sentences like “If ‘A isn’t true’ is true, then A isn’t true” or claims
about material composition such as “If a tree is composed of atoms, then there is a group
of atoms that composes it.”
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the soundness of his proof is to reject (1); but “(1) is about as certain as any
philosophical claim ever gets” (forthcoming 4).
We disagree. We maintain that condition (i) is false. In particular, there
are middle Cs such that it is not the case that virtually all philosophers would
assign them a high credence. Frances’s argument is therefore unsound. This
is what we will argue in the next section (§2). We then go on to dispute an
alternative implication of the proof and close by presenting Frances with a
dilemma (§3).
2. Against the Proof
Again, we think that condition (i) is false, which means that we deny that some
C is commonsensical: say, some middle C. But, says Frances (forthcoming:
2–3), denying any middle C would entail the falsity of a proposition that is
eminently commonsensical:
(R) There are not two people who differ by only a few cents and
yet just one of them is rich.
The proposition ∼(R) is entailed by the denial of any middle C. But Frances
claims that ∼(R) goes against common sense. If asked to judge one way or
another, virtually all contemporary philosophers will be strongly disposed to
assign (R) a high credence. So virtually all contemporary philosophers will
also be strongly disposed to assign high credences to the middle Cs rather
than their negations. Thus, the middle Cs are all commonsensical (again,
amongst contemporary philosophers).
But consider now the prevalence of vagueness in natural language. Virtu-
ally all contemporary philosophers are familiar with the concept of borderlin-
earity. There are certain amounts of pennies such that, if a person possessed
that number of pennies, they would not be definitely rich or definitely not
rich. Let i¢ (where 1 < i < 1014) be a constant which denotes such an amount.
Thus the following statement is vague:
(I) Anyone with less than i¢ is not rich.
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(I) involves a borderline case of richness, so it is not the case that virtually all
contemporary philosophers who understand (I) will be strongly disposed to
give (I) a high credence. They will not be sure whether anyone with less than
i¢ is rich or not. If anything, they will most likely be disposed to give (I) a
middling credence.3
But there will also be middle Cs in the Sorites that involve borderline
cases of richness:
(I′) If anyone with less than (i – 1)¢ is not rich, then anyone
with less than i¢ is not rich.
Because it is a middle C, Frances must maintain that (I′) is commonsensical;
to deny it would mean denying (R), which clashes with common sense on his
account. But recall why Frances excludes propositions like “There are twice
as many positive integers as there are even positive integers” from counting
as commonsensical despite seeming obviously true: enough contemporary
philosophers have some acquaintance with elementary transfinite number
theory to know that such propositions are false. Thus, in Frances’s terms,
such propositions are not commonsensical, for virtually everyone within
the contemporary philosophical community who understands them will be
strongly disposed to assign them a low credence—namely, 0.
We contend that (R) is like the proposition about integers above. Enough
contemporary philosophers have the requisite amount of acquaintance with
different theories of vagueness to know that, according to those theories, (R)
is false despite seeming obviously true. Indeed, many of those theories seek
to explain why (R) seems true, despite its falsity.4 Thus, (R) is not a propo-
3 Bacon (2018) argues that agents can have precise credences in vague statements; Field
(2000) and Schiffer (2003) have argued otherwise. Additionally, Rinard (2015) contends
that credences in statements involving borderline cases are indeterminate, falling within a
range. We wish to remain neutral on whether or not the credence one assigns to (I) is a
precise credence in a vague statement, or a function of credences to (I)’s precisifications. It
could even be an imprecise credence. But surely if one can have some credence in a vague
statement, whatever its nature, then it should be middling. If credences in vague statements
are not allowed, then so much the worse for Frances’s analysis of commonsensicality—for
Frances is committed to all of the middle Cs having high credences.
4 Thanks to Eli Hirsch for helpful discussion on this point. The main theories currently
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sition such that virtually everyone within the contemporary philosophical
community who understands it will be strongly disposed to assign it a high
credence. Hence, (R) is not commonsensical in Frances’s sense.
Frances reasons in the following way: ∼(I′) implies ∼(R). But ∼(R) goes
against common sense. So (I′) is commonsensical. However, if (R) is not
commonsensical in Frances’s sense, as we’ve argued, then ∼(R) does not go
against common sense. This undermines his motivation for maintaining that
(I′) is commonsensical.
Moreover, (I′) is vague. Note first that the consequent of (I′)—namely,
(I)—is vague; (I) involves a borderline case of richness. We claimed above that
(I) warrants a middling credence. But if (I′)’s antecedent is either definitely
true or vague, then for all we know (I′) could have a true antecedent and a
false conclusion. Given that (I′) is a vague claim, it too would seem to warrant
at most a middling credence. It would certainly be inadvisable to assign (I′)
a high credence. Thus, it is not the case that virtually all philosophers who
understand (I′) would be strongly disposed to give it a high credence. So (I′)
is not commonsensical. Therefore, Frances’s first premise is false.
Even if one was inclined to assign (I′) a high credence on the basis of (R),
we do not think that virtually all philosophers would be strongly disposed
to do so. We think our reasons for assigning (I′) a middling credence are
compelling; they stem from a prior understanding of borderlinearity. Plus,
many contemporary philosophers think that (R) is false. So we think that
others would judge similarly. But barring virtual unanimity on (I)’s credence,
it should not be counted as commonsensical on Frances’s analysis. So even if
our reasoning is not unanimously held, Frances’s argument still fails.
Frances has a trick up his sleeve: his revenge proof (forthcoming: 4–5). He
argues that his first premise, that is, (1) above, is commonsensical: virtually
all members of the contemporary philosophical community agree that there is
a way of interpreting the Sorites claims such that they are all commonsensical
and lead to paradox. We have argued that Frances’s first premise is false.
on the table are supervaluationism, epistemicism, and onticism. According to both
supervaluationism and epistemicism, (R) is false. It may even be false on certain ontic
accounts.
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But then, Frances retorts, we have shown that (1) is a false common sense
claim. Even further, there is a good philosophical argument to the effect that
some commonsensical claim is not true—namely, the conclusion of his first
argument. So, he claims, his conclusion still stands.
For this argument to run, Frances has to maintain that (1) is commonsen-
sical relative to the contemporary philosophical community. He claims that
to deny this is “…to deny a stubborn, empirical, non-normative fact … that
the vast majority of philosophers familiar with the sorites think that the Cs
can have their obvious logical characteristics and still be commonsensical”
(forthcoming: 5).
But this reply does not work. Frances claims that virtually all philosophers
who understand (1) would be strongly disposed to give it a high credence. But
(1) implies the controversial claim that (I′) is commonsensical. Philosophers
do often talk of the Sorites as if all of its premises are “commonsensical.”
But clearly they are not all using the word “commonsensical” in Frances’s
sense. As discussed above, there are strong considerations to which many
philosophers would agree in favor of attributing a middling credence to
(I′). So it is not the case that virtually all philosophers would be strongly
disposed to maintain that all of the Cs are commonsensical. So (1) is not
commonsensical.
3. Kinds of Common Sense
If Frances’s argument had worked, what would it have shown? His conclusion,
recall, is that some common sense propositions are false.
But which common sense propositions? Frances carves up common sense
into different categories. There are common sense propositions such as “Some
people are rich” or “Here is a hand” which make up the Everyday Life Claims
(ELCs). And then there are common sense propositions such as the Sorites
Cs and mereological ones like “If a tree is composed of atoms, then there is a
group of atoms that composes it” which make up the Philosophical Claims
(PCs).5
5 Frances also mentions two other categories of commonsensical claims—Elementary Logic
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Does Frances’s proof target ELCs or PCs? As Frances sees it, he need not
settle the matter. For if his proof entails that there are false PCs, then most
of us are bad at philosophy since “a great many of us endorse those false
claims in our work” (forthcoming: 7). And if his proof entails that there are
false ELCs, then Moorean methodology is unstable6 and must therefore be
abandoned.
So Frances presents us with a challenge. In this section, we will show
how that challenge falls short. First, we will argue that Frances’s proof only
entails that there are false PCs and that this renders his proof dialectically
ineffective against the Moorean. We will then show why this does not imply
that philosophers are bad at philosophy. This leaves Frances with a challenge
of his own.
We think that Frances’s proof only targets PCs. Here is our argument:
(i) Consider a set of commonsensical claims which lead to paradox. If
Frances’s argument is sound, then at least one of the Cs is false.
(ii) The Cs will either consist of PCs alone or PCs and ELCs.
(iii) If the former, then a PC is false.
(iv) If the latter, then a PC is false.
(v) Therefore, if Frances’s argument is sound, then a PC, not an ELC, is
false.
We take (iv) to be the most controversial premise here.7 Below we motivate
it and along the way show how Frances’s proof is dialectically ineffective
against the Moorean, even if successful.
Claims and Interpretation Claims—but we ignore them here as they are not directly
relevant to our argument.
6 Officially, Frances says “unreliable,” but it is too quick to conclude that Moorean method-
ology is unreliable simply because some ELCs (or PCs, for that matter) are false. Similar
reasoning about perception would yield the implausible conclusion that perception is
unreliable because it occasionally leads us astray. We therefore take Frances’s argument
to be showing how Moorean methodology is internally inconsistent, or “unstable.”
7 One might also question (ii). But we think (ii) is reasonably justified by induction: as far
as anyone can tell, no paradoxical set of Cs has consisted of ELCs alone.
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Premise (iv) states that if the Cs consist of PCs and ELCs, then a PC is false.
Why? It comes down to the fact that PCs are not the paradigm of common
sense for the Moorean. Indeed, the Moorean should be willing to grant
that there are plenty of false propositions that are (or were) commonsensical
in Frances’s sense. Take, for instance, the proposition the Sun orbits the
Earth. Surely, this proposition was commonsensical in Frances’s sense for
most Eleatics. So it was commonsensical (again, in Frances’s sense) for that
community at that time. The Moorean will think the same goes for many
other commonsensical beliefs that we now consider false.
Mooreans can grant this because they don’t think such propositions belong
to common sense’s “Hard Core.”8 Hard Core propositions are such that
they count as commonsensical for everyone, no matter the culture or epoch
they happen to inhabit. Thus, the Hard Core isn’t just commonsensical at
certain times for certain communities. Rather, propositions that belong to
the Hard Core are, we might say, the “most” commonsensical: the greatest
number of people—philosophers and non-philosophers alike—assign them
the highest credence.
Notice that propositions like “Things move” and “Here is a hand” are
ELCs. So it is clear that ELCs belong to the Hard Core. But do PCs? We
doubt it.9 To illustrate, consider what we take be some commonsensical PCs:
• there are not different ways of being;
• there are no vague objects;
• it is impossible for an object to have a determinable but no determinate
of that determinable;
• no two things of the same sort can coincide.
We take these claims to have once been considered commonsensical amongst
philosophers. Arguably, this is no longer the case. Many of the claims above
have now been shown to be highly implausible, if not outright false.10 Indeed,
8 The term originates with Kelly (2008: 54).
9 See Lycan 2007: 95, fn. 30.
10 See Turner 2010 and McDaniel 2017 for the first claim; Evans 1978, Hawley 2002, van
Inwagen 2009, and Barnes 2010 for the second; Wilson 2013 for the third; and Fine 2000
for the fourth.
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it might be part of future philosophical common sense to believe the negations
of these propositions. But unlike PCs, ELCs do not “shift” in this way. So,
even if Frances is right that there are false common sense propositions, they
are just not the kind of common sense that Mooreans are attempting to
defend from attack.11 So, even if Frances’s proof is successful, it would be
dialectically ineffective against the Moorean.
Now, even if Frances’s proof leaves the Moorean approach untouched,
it has serious consequences for philosophical theorizing across the board: if
PCs alone are to blame, then most of us are bad at philosophy. At least so
claims Frances.
But we think that this conclusion is too hasty. Philosophy is, after all, a
highly speculative endeavor. Surely most philosophers would be unsurprised
to learn that many of the philosophical claims they have endorsed in their
work are false or inconsistent, even ones considered commonsensical amongst
philosophers (just see the list above). Moreover, if the average philosopher is
not a Moorean—nor sympathetic to common sense in general—then it would
hardly be a surprise for them to learn that some of their philosophical beliefs
are inconsistent or false given that, in principle, most of their beliefs (if not
all of them) are subject to revision.
Does this mean that philosophers are bad at their jobs? We are skeptical.
True, we often think of success as a function of how well one does something
or how reliably one arrives at the truth. An archer that hits a bullseye time
and again is good at archery, not bad at it. A mathematician able to prove
many incredibly difficult theorems is good at mathematics, not bad at it. Is
the metric not the same in philosophy?
We are not so sure. In fact, it seems that being good or bad at philosophy
is not necessarily a function of reliably getting at the truth. One can imagine
a particularly creative philosopher whose views are often false yet whose
perspective is always enlightening. Such a philosopher would be good at
philosophy in our books. Of course, if you can get at the truths, more
11 Additionally, there are paradoxes which have all “commonsensical” premises (in some
sense of the word) and an absurd conclusion, so some element of “common sense” so
construed must be false. But this sense of “commonsensical” is not the same one that the
Moorean is defending. See also Quine 1966 and Lycan 2010.
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power to you. But failing to do so does not make you a philosophical failure.
So, even if Frances’s proof is successful, it would not necessarily show that
philosophers are bad at their jobs; for it is unclear that what it means for
philosophers to be good at their jobs is to always be tracking the truth.
If all of this is right, then Frances is in a jam: if his proof targets PCs,
then even if it is successful, it is dialectically ineffective against the Moorean.
But if his opponent is not the Moorean, it could only be the non-Moorean
philosopher who probably does not assign common sense much weight in
the first place, which would make the results of his proof, even if successful,
unsurprising. So his proof misfires in both directions.
What sort of argument would work against the Moorean? In light of our
present discussion, we speculate that such an argument would have to be one
that featured all Hard Core propositions as premises. But an argument like
that, we submit, has yet to be advanced.12
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